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A lifetime accumulation limit will put Canadians who do not enjoy
career membership in a defined-benefit pension plan on the same
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PENSION PAPERSCanadian tax rules allow accumulation of retirement savings in “tax assisted” plans,
including defined-benefit (DB) pension plans, defined-contribution (DC) pension plans
and RRSPs. These plans are intended primarily for workers with “middle class” incomes,
who will not receive enough pension income from programs such as Old Age Security
(OAS) and the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan (C/QPP). 
With career membership in generous defined-benefit pension plans, a small minority of
Canadian workers can and does accumulate good pensions with values ranging from
$550,000, for a worker with a career-end salary of $50,000, to $2.1 million with a career-
end salary of $150,000. With RRSP savings included, their accumulations of retirement
wealth are even greater. 
But more than12 million Canadian workers do not participate in a DB pension. Many will
need to save for retirement, and must do so in DC pension plans and RRSPs. In the current
environment of low interest rates, an aging population, and increasing longevity, these
workers have less time to save for retirement and must save more. But can they? 
To answer this question, we compare the tax-deferred saving opportunities available in DB
plans, DC plans, and RRSPs, using an actuarial modelling tool that incorporates Canadian
tax rules for retirement saving from 1974 through 2011. The model also simulates career
retirement-saving outcomes that would have occurred if “pension reform” tax rules
implemented in 1990 had been in place from 1974 to 2011. 
Our model demonstrates that tax rules are preventing many workers from saving enough,
and indeed, from accumulating even half the retirement wealth of some DB pension plan
members. This indicates a serious problem of inequity, the prospect of low living standards
for future retirees and an increasing burden on income-support programs funded from
general tax revenue. Those at particular risk of not having enough DC/RRSP contribution
room include new Canadians, self-employed workers, and those who have incurred
investment losses, experienced periods of unemployment or made RRSP withdrawals
before retirement. 
Major reform is needed, so that all workers for whom the “tax-assisted” retirement saving
system is intended can save enough for their retirements. To make this a reality, we propose
that Canada’s annual, income-based tax limits on retirement saving be discarded and
replaced with a uniform, inflation-indexed lifetime accumulation limit of $2 million – the
value of pensions now accumulated by high-income workers with career membership in
generous DB pension plans, especially in the public sector. 
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A
previous paper of this series
(Pierlot 2008) introduced two
couples with identical family
incomes. Having both retired from
public sector careers at age 58 with
pension benefits worth $1.2 million,
Angie and Brad are now receiving
almost five times more pension
income than Courtney and Dave,
who had $248,000 in pension and
Registered Retirement Savings Plan
(RRSP) savings when they retired at
age 62 from their private sector careers.
We would now like to introduce you
to seven other workers who are
considering retirement. Each is 60
years old: 
Alice has been working for 35 years as an
elementary school teacher. The eight years of leave
she took to care for children were counted as
pension service. Her annual salary is $85,000 and
her pension is worth $1.09 million. Having used
half of her RRSP contribution room, she now has
RRSP savings of $83,000. Her annual pension
income will be $50,900.
1
George is an assistant deputy minister with 
35 years of service in the Department of Finance.
His salary is $150,000, his pension is worth 
$2.08 million, and he has RRSP savings of $40,000.
George’s annual pension income will be $91,900. 
Candace has worked for 35 years as an
administrator in a provincial government
department. Her salary is $50,000 and her
pension is worth $556,000. Having used half of
her RRSP contribution room, she has $112,000
in RRSP savings. Her annual pension income will
be $29,000.
Paulo is an auto mechanic who immigrated to
Canada at age 34. He earns $50,000 and has been
making the maximum allowable RRSP contributions
since he began working, except for periods of
unemployment totalling three years. Paulo has
$252,000 in RRSP savings, enough for a pension
of $10,900 per year.
Sebastien immigrated to Canada in 1991. He
drove a taxi while working to complete licensing
exams and obtain recognition of his qualifications
as a professional engineer. In 1996, he found work
in his field and began making maximum
contributions to his RRSP. He earns $75,000 per
year and has RRSP savings of $264,000, enough
for a pension of $11,500 per year.
Sophia started working as a hospital radiologist
at age 35 following 12 years of post-secondary
education. She and her employer made maximum
contributions to the hospital’s defined-contribution
(DC) pension plan throughout her career. Her
annual salary is now $250,000 and her retirement
savings are worth $631,000, enough for a pension
of $27,400 per year.
Anjani launched a software firm in 1995. By
the time her business became profitable in 2001,
she had used all her personal and RRSP savings to
We thank Steve Bonnar, Malcolm Hamilton, Alexandre Laurin, Bill Robson, Fred Vettese, and members of the C.D. Howe Institute Pension
Policy Council for providing comments. Responsibility for any errors or omissions rests with the authors. This paper is a further development of
policy recommendations first introduced by James Pierlot in a previous publication in this series. Faisal Siddiqi and Marta Spaic created the
actuarial modeling tool used to determine the pension and RRSP values presented throughout. 
1 For all workers, pensions are paid in the form described in Table A-1 (Panels C and D) of the Appendix. To allow for an apples-to-apples
comparison with the pension incomes shown for the four private sector workers, the stylized pensions shown for each public sector worker
reflect the conversion of the value ($55,600) of indexed temporary bridging benefits paying $11,520 annually from age 60 to 65 into a
pension payable for life. Assuming post-retirement inflation of 2.5 percent, the nominal annual pensions for each public-sector worker at age
60 and 65 would be as follows: Alice – $60,000 to age 65 and $54,800 thereafter; George – $101,000 to age 65 and $101,300 thereafter;
Candace – $38,100 to age 65 and $30,100 thereafter.C.D. Howe Institute
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pay her living expenses. With 25 employees and
expanding sales in Canada and abroad, Anjani
now draws an annual salary of $200,000. Having
made maximum contributions to her RRSP since
2001, she now has $218,000 in RRSP savings,
enough for a pension of $9,500 per year.
Alice and George are clear winners, as Table 1
shows. Even without using all of her RRSP
contribution room, Alice has been able to
accumulate pension and RRSP benefits worth
61.3 percent of her career income, which will
provide pension income that replaces 59.8 percent
of her career-end salary. George will get a pension
of $91,900 per year, replacing 61.3 percent of his
salary. Alice and George are likely to have
comfortable retirements. 
Sophia and Anjani are clear losers. With no
RRSP contribution room from the 12 years she
spent in post-secondary education and because of
limits on DC contributions, Sophia’s pension will
replace only 11.0 percent of her salary. Anjani
took considerable personal risk to create a viable
business that employs 25 workers, but did not
have enough RRSP room because of low earnings
while her business was launching and the RRSP
withdrawals she made. Her pension of $9,500 per
year will replace only 4.7 percent of her final
salary. Unless they have other savings, Sophia and
Anjani cannot afford to retire.
The stories of Alice, George, Candace, Paulo,
Sebastien, Sophia, and Anjani show the unfairness
of Canada’s retirement saving system, which favours
workers with career membership in generous
defined-benefit (DB) pension plans and penalizes
everyone else, for the following reasons:
￿ pension and RRSP contribution limits have little
or no connection to how much pension income
workers need – or to how much they are willing to
save; 
￿ members of DB pension plans have more than
twice as much room to accumulate retirement
benefits as those who save in RRSPs and DC
pension plans;
￿ public sector workers can accumulate much larger
pensions than can private sector workers; 
￿ early-starting savers have more tax room than late-
starting savers;
￿ workers with stable incomes have more saving
room than workers with fluctuating incomes; and
￿ Canadian-born workers have more saving room
than immigrants. 
As Canada’s population ages, the negative effects
of these “broad deficiencies” – as the federal
government once described them (Canada 1984)
– of the retirement income system will become
more pronounced. Until now, retired workers
have been able to maintain their post-retirement
consumption rates “relatively well,” but projections
of future retirees’ incomes suggest that tomorrow’s
retired workers will not enjoy the same standard
of living because pension plan coverage, saving
rates, and real investment returns have declined,
even as life expectancy has increased (see Moore,
Robson, and Laurin 2010). 
To retire well, today’s workers will need to save
more. But without major reform to Canada’s tax
rules for retirement saving, most private sector
workers – and workers who join the public service
late in their careers – will not be able to accumulate
enough pension and RRSP savings to maintain
their standard of living in retirement. They will
have to retire with less income than they need, 
or look to other saving strategies to make up 
the shortfall. 
To address these issues, we proceed in six parts.
First, we show the inequity of access inherent in
Canada’s tax rules for retirement saving. Second,
we show how Canada’s tax rules for retirement
saving evolved to prevent many private sector
workers from saving enough in their RRSPs.
Third, we show that workers saving for retirement
in RRSPs cannot reasonably hope to accumulate
even half the pension values that routinely
accumulate in DB pension plans. Fourth, we
propose the immediate implementation of a
lifetime retirement-saving accumulation limit that
would apply to all Canadians equally, be indexed
to wage inflation, and benchmarked to provide
wealth-accumulation room similar to that now
available to members of DB plans and actually
attained by many public sector workers. Fifth, we
explain how such an accumulation limit would
deliver equity of access across all classes of workers,Essential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute 
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promote increased rates of pension coverage,
decrease regulatory costs, and provide better
information to pension policymakers about
Canadians’ retirement readiness. Finally, we
describe how to implement a lifetime accumulation
limit, address transitional issues, and conclude
with a call for immediate action by legislators. 
Although we focus considerable attention on
public sector pensions, this is not intended as a
commentary on public sector compensation, nor
do we advocate any reduction in public sector
pension benefits. The career public sector pension
values shown throughout this Commentary are
presented solely to show how Canada’s tax rules
for retirement saving effectively discriminate
against private sector workers – and workers with
partial careers in the public service – and to
identify a reasonable benchmark for a lifetime
retirement-savings accumulation limit that would
ensure that public and private sector workers alike
have enough retirement-saving room. 
The Haves and the Have-nots 
DB pension plans provide the best pension
benefits, and about 4.5 million Canadian workers
participate in them. These are the pension
“haves,” of whom 2.8 million work in the public
sector – with public sector employment at 
3.5 million, that translates to a coverage rate of 
80 percent. In the private sector, 1.7 million of
13.6 million workers participate in DB pension
plans, for a coverage rate of 12 percent. This is
down from 31 percent in 1977, reflecting an ever-
widening gap between public and private sector
Table 1: Seven Prospective Retirees
Source: Authors’ calculations.






As % of 
Career Income
Annual
As % of 
Final Salary
($) ($ millions) ($ millions) (%) ($) (%)
Alice  85,000 1.91 1.17 61.3 50,900 59.8
George 150,000 3.37 2.12 62.7 91,900 61.3
Candace 50,000 1.12 0.668 59.5 29,000 58.1
Paulo 50,000 0.827 0.252 30.5 10,900 21.9
Sebastien 75,000 1.12 0.264 23.6 11,500 15.3
Sophia 250,000 4.60 0.631 13.7 27 ,400 11.0
Anjani 200,000 3.28 0.218 6.7 9,500 4.7C.D. Howe Institute
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pension benefit security. Although only one
worker in four is a public servant, more than half
of all pension plan members work in the public
sector (Statistics Canada Tables 4, 6, 11).
The public-private sector gap extends beyond
coverage rates. Private sector DB plans usually
provide less generous benefits, and benefits are less
secure from the risk of employer insolvency. As at
June 30, 2010, DB plans registered in Ontario
had a median solvency ratio of 86 percent, and
only 16 percent of plans were fully funded; at the
same date, the average solvency ratio of federally
registered DB plans was 87 percent. Practically,
this means that most members of private sector
DB plans would lose a portion of their pension
benefits in the event of employer insolvency
(FSCO 2011; OSFI 2010). Public sector pension
plans are similarly underfunded, but the risk of
employer insolvency is much lower.
2
The pension “have-nots” are the 12 million
Canadian workers who do not participate in a DB
pension plan. More than half are employed by
small and medium-sized businesses that often do
not sponsor any kind of pension plan, and almost
three million are self-employed (LaRochelle-Côté
2010). Private sector workers are more likely to
change jobs, experience periods of unemployment,
and have fluctuating incomes (LaRochelle-Côté
and Gilmore 2009). These “have-nots,” if they
save for retirement at all, do so in RRSPs, DC
pension plans, and capital accumulation plans
(CAPs). Under the Income Tax Act, however, CAP
contribution limits are much lower than for DB
pension plans.
3 After a full career of contributions
at the maximum levels permitted, a CAP typically
delivers less than half the retirement pension that
a DB pension plan can provide – and that public
sector plans actually provide. In DB plans, tax
rules allow “catch-up” contributions for periods of
temporary absence from the workforce or to
compensate for investment losses, but workers
who save in CAPs do not have this catch-up
contribution room.
4
For Canada’s 3.2 million immigrant workers,
annual, income-based retirement-saving limits are
especially harsh. Immigrants have a harder time
saving for retirement because they have lower
wages, less stable employment, shorter job tenure
than Canadian-born workers, and lower rates of
pension coverage (see Pierlot 2008;  Gilmore
2009). Mid-career immigrants have no
accumulated RRSP room and therefore cannot
accumulate the same tax-deferred retirement
wealth as a Canadian-born worker can. 
Retirement Saving Limits: 
A Brief History 
Ottawa has allowed tax-deferred retirement saving
since 1919 – see Table 2 for a timeline of some of
the most important rule introductions and changes.
As the adage goes, everything old becomes new
again. Nowhere is this truer than in Canadian
retirement savings policy. The stated policy goal of
Canada’s tax rules for retirement saving is to help
middle– and higher-income Canadians prepare for
retirement, with fair access for all. As the federal
government has stated, 
Canadians in the middle and higher income
brackets must supplement their public pensions
with income from employer-sponsored pension
plans [and] individual retirement saving plans
(Canada 1984), and 
2 Recent sovereign debt crises demonstrate that governments can also become bankrupt, but most would agree that that members of Canadian
public sector pension plans currently face little risk from employer insolvency: the balance sheets of the federal and provincial governments
are healthier than those of troubled countries abroad.
3 Income Tax Act (ITA), c. 1 (5th Supp.) R.S.C. 1985, as amended.
4 Participants in individual pension plans (IPPs), which provide benefits based on a DB formula, can accumulate retirement benefits at higher
levels than in CAPs and sometimes make past-service contributions calculated on the basis of a DB-style formula. The conditions under
which this is possible and make financial sense are quite restricted, however, and the 2011 federal budget proposed to make them more
restrictive still. Only about 10,000 IPPs are currently registered.Essential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute 
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a new system of fairer, more comprehensive, and
more flexible limits on tax-assisted retirement
saving is required. Such a system could provide
greater uniformity in the treatment of various
pension arrangements....Improved flexibility could
give older workers and workers with fluctuating
employment earnings greater scope to compensate
for not having contributed fully to their plans in
certain years. (Canada 1982.)
These sensible policy aspirations, however, remain
unfulfilled. Studies of the tax-deferred retirement
saving system leading up to the pension reform of
1990 pointed to the problem of “unequal tax
assistance” sourced in rules that treat workers
differently depending on when they save for
retirement, their employment situations, and the
type of plan in which they participate: 
The present tax treatment of these plans has three
broad deficiencies. First, the rules result in unequal
access to tax assistance owing to the vastly different
pension-building potential available to workers in
different employment situations. Second, the rules
impose rigid requirements in the timing of
retirement saving, providing little opportunity to
individuals to make up for failure to contribute in
earlier years. Third, there is no adjustment for
inflation.…The problem of unequal tax assistance
grows out of the fact that two essentially separate
systems have evolved, one for defined benefit plans
and the other – less favourable – for money
purchase plans. (Canada 1984; emphasis in the
original). 
Twenty-seven years on, this continues to be a fair
description of the deficiencies of Canada’s tax rules
for retirement saving. In 1990, amendments were
made to the Income Tax Act and regulations to
reform pension and RRSP savings limits. But
pension reform failed to deliver equitable access to
tax-assisted retirement saving because it perpetuated
much greater access for DB plan members and
those with stable employment incomes. The 1984
Department of Finance study (Canada 1984) had
recommended that saving limits for all plans be
based on total career earnings, adjusted for wage
inflation, but even after pension reform DB
pensions continued to be based on a three-year
average of the employee’s final or best earnings,
while CAP contributions were limited to a
percentage of career average earnings.
In fairness, pension reform did improve the
situation somewhat for those who save in CAPs,
by increasing the dollar limits for CAP
contributions, by replacing the “use it or lose it”
rule for RRSP contributions with the carry-
forward of unused contribution room, and by
indexing saving limits to the average wage –
though indexing was not actually introduced 
until 2004, 14 years after the introduction of the
pension reform. 
Retirement Saving Limits Today
Today, annual contributions to DC plans and
RRSPs are limited to the least of 18 percent of
income and fixed-dollar limits indexed to wage
inflation.
5 In contrast, there is no limit on
contributions required to fund permitted DB
pensions, but benefits are limited to the lesser of 
2 percent of the average of a worker’s best three
years of earnings and an indexed amount ($2,552
in 2011), multiplied by years of pension service.
DB plans also may provide “ancillary” benefits
such as inflation indexing and “bridge” pensions
that are paid until the normal retirement age
under public programs such as the Canada
Pension Plan (CPP) and Old Age Security (OAS). 
Pension reform purported to deliver the same
saving room to those who save in DC plans and
RRSPs as members of DB pension plans enjoy
through the equalizing “factor of nine,” which
presumes that it costs an average of nine dollars in
contributions to buy one dollar of pension. This,
5 In 2011, the DC contribution limit is $22,970 and the RRSP limit is $22,450 (the DC limit for 2010). The DB pension limit ($2,552) is
1/9th of the 2011 DC contribution limit. These limits apply to a worker earning $127,611 or more in 2011 and are reduced by the 18 percent
limit for workers earning less.C.D. Howe Institute
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Table 2: Federal Tax Rules for Retirement Saving
Source: Canada 2010a; CCH Canadian Limited 1970-1990; and Morneau Sobeco 2004.
Year New or Amended Tax Rules
1917 ￿ Income Tax War Act introduces Canada’s first income tax.
1919 ￿ Income Tax War Act amended to permit deduction of employee pension contributions.
1936 ￿ Employee pension deductions limited to $300 annually.
1940 ￿ Employer pension contributions limited to $300 per employee, up to a maximum of 5% of payroll.
1957 ￿ RRSPs introduced; contributions limited to the least of $2,500 and 10% of income, or $1,500 less
contributions to a pension plan.
1964 ￿ DB pension limit set at $1,143 per year of service.
1972 ￿ Employer/employee DC contribution limits increased from $1,500/$1,500 to $3,500/$3,500.
￿ RRSP limit increased to lesser of $4,000 and 20% of income.
1976 ￿ RRSP limit increased to lesser of $5,500 and 20% of income.
￿ DB pension limit increased to $1,715 per year of service.
1986 ￿ RRSP limit increased to lesser of $7 ,500 and 20% of income. 
1991 ￿ Pension reform introduced; DB limit set at $1,722 per year of service.
￿ DC/RRSP contributions limited to $12,500/$11,500 as deficit-cutting measure. 
1995 ￿ Transfers of severance payments to an RRSP no longer permitted for years after 1995. 
1997
￿ Pension adjustment reversal introduced to restore RRSP room to individuals who cease 
membership in DB pension plans.
￿ Pension adjustment offset reduced from $1,000 to $600.
1990–2010
￿ DC limit:
– set at $11,500 in 1990 and increased $1,000 annually to $15,500 by 1995;
– reduced to $13,500 from 1996 through 2002;
– increased to $15,500 in 2003 and to $16,500 in 2004;
– increased from $16,500 to $22,450 from 2004 to 2011. 
￿ DB limit:
– frozen at $1,722 from 1990 to 2003;
– increased from $1,833 to $2,494 from 2004 through 2010. 
￿ RRSP limit:
– $7 ,500 (1990), $13,500 (1996), and $14,500 (2003);
– for all other years after 1990, limit is the DC limit for the previous year. 
2011 ￿ DC/DB limits indexed to wage inflation. 
￿ Inflation-indexed DC and DB limits are $22,970 and $2,552, respectively.Essential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute 
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however, has always been a faulty assumption, and
never more so than in the current economic
environment. Earlier retirement, increasing life
expectancy, and low investment returns mean that
pensions routinely cost more than twice as much
as the factor of nine would suggest, with the result
that DC plans and RRSPs cannot realistically
deliver even half the retirement income that DB
plans can provide. 
When pension reform was introduced, the DC
limit was supposed to be $15,500 – nine times the
DB limit of $1,722, with each limit indexed to
inflation. As a deficit-cutting measure, the federal
government froze the DB limit at $1,722 from
1990 to 2003 and kept the DC limit at an average
$13,423. For 13 years, the factor of nine effectively
became the “factor of 7.8,” even as the federal
government rather disingenuously asserted that
“the reductions in pension and RRSP limits will
not compromise the integrity and effectiveness of
the private retirement saving system” (Canada
1995). These reduced CAP contribution limits
meant that savers in DC plans and RRSPs –
already disadvantaged compared to DB plan
members – sacrificed much more in support of
the federal government’s fiscal austerity agenda.
Moreover, because today’s indexed DB limits
apply retroactively to all years of service, members
of final-pay DB pension plans who are retiring
now have been able to catch up partially for the
years during which the DB limit was frozen, but
those who have saved in DC plans and RRSPs will
never get back the contribution room they lost
from 1990 to 2003.
The Canadian Retirement Saving Hierarchy 
In practical terms, Figure 1 shows how tax limits
on the accumulation of retirement benefits apply
to workers with 35-year careers, depending on
their annual income at retirement. In each group,
the workers have the same career salaries. The
explanation of the bars in the figure is as follows:
￿ Bar A shows the amount each worker could have
accumulated by contributing 9 percent of earnings
to an RRSP each year, up to the limits permitted
under tax rules. 
￿ Bar B shows the amount each worker could have
accumulated by making maximum annual RRSP
contributions permitted throughout the worker’s
career. 
￿ Bar C shows the value of the pension each worker
would receive from the federal public sector
pension plan. 
￿ Bar D shows the values from bar C, added to the
RRSP savings each worker would have accumulated
by maximizing his or her annual RRSP contributions.
￿ Bar E shows the pension value each worker would
have accumulated as a member of a DB pension
plan that provided the most generous benefits
permitted under the Income Tax Act. 
￿ Bar F shows the pension value in bar E, added to
the RRSP savings each worker would have
accumulated by maximizing his or her annual
RRSP contributions. 
For each worker, bars A and C are the most
instructive: 
￿ Bar A shows the realistic, best-case RRSP
accumulation scenarios for the large majority of
private sector workers who do not participate in
DB pension plans. Most workers saving in an
RRSP do not actually accumulate these amounts. 
￿ Bar C shows the pension values that career federal
public sector workers are actually accumulating.
Most public sector pension plans provide similar
benefits, so the values shown are a reasonable
estimate of the value of pensions provided to
career public servants who work for other levels of
government. 
Pension Reform: Tried – but Not Tested 
Pension Reform is often assumed to have
equalized “tax assistance” for retirement saving
and to have removed the relative tax advantage
that DB pension plans enjoyed before the reform
was implemented (see Li 2007). This conventional
wisdom has not been tested in any methodical
way, however, and it is surprising that, after 20
years, there is no evidence that the Department of
Finance has attempted to evaluate how well its
pension reform project has performed by finding
the answers to two key questions. First, doworkers in all sectors of the economy have enough
saving room to achieve adequate retirement
income from tax-assisted retirement saving plans?
Second, does the factor of nine equalize the
retirement benefit accumulation room of DB
pension plans and RRSPs? Answering these
questions would require calculating the retirement
savings that a real-world worker can accumulate in
an RRSP or DC pension plan, an assessment of
whether those accumulations can provide adequate
pension income, and a comparison with pension
values accumulated by career members of DB
pension plans. 
We, in fact, have undertaken this analysis using
a model that incorporates tax rules from 1974
through 2011. The results are presented in Figures
2 through 7, which show retirement wealth
accumulations for workers earning $50,000,
$75,000, and $150,000 at retirement. Each
worker retires at age 60 in 2011 after a career of
33, 35, or 37 years. Accumulations are shown for
four types of tax-deferred plans: an RRSP, a DC
pension plan, the federal public sector pension
plan, and a DB pension plan providing the most
generous benefits permitted under the Income Tax
Act. (See the Appendix for a summary of the
actuarial methods and assumptions we used to
determine the values presented in each figure.)
For each salary level, there are two figures. The
first figure in each set shows the accumulations
that would have occurred under the tax rules that
were in effect from 1974 to 2011. The factor of
C.D. Howe Institute

























Annual Salary at Retirement
B AC D E F B AC D E F B AC D E F
$221,403
A. RRSP: 9% Career  Contribution
B. RRSP: Theoretical  Maximum
C. Public Sector Pension (Actual)
D. Public Sector Pension with RRSP
E. Maximum DB Pension Limit
F. Maximum DB Pension with RRSP
A      B     C     D       E     F A      B     C     D      E     F A      B     C     D       E     F
Source: Authors’ calculations; see the Appendix.
Figure 1: Career-End Comparison of RRSP and DB Pension Outcomes
RRSP / Pension Values 35-Year Career  |  Retirement at Age 60Essential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute 
























1. RRSP: 9% Contribution
2. RRSP: Maximum
3. DC Plan: Maximum
4. Public Sector Plan
5. Public Sector with RRSP
6. Maximum DB Pension
7. Max DB Pension + RRSP
13 6 45 27 1 3 6 45 27 1 3 6 45 27
Source for Figures 2 and 3: Authors’ calculations; see the Appendix.



























1. RRSP: 9% Contribution
2. RRSP: Maximum
3. DC Plan: Maximum
4. Public Sector Plan
5. Public Sector with RRSP
6. Maximum DB Pension
7. Max DB Pension + RRSP
Figure 3: Career Accumulations – $50,000 Salary at Retirement (Theoretical Full Career under “Factor of 9”)C.D. Howe Institute



























1. RRSP: 9% Contribution
2. RRSP: Maximum
3. DC Plan: Maximum
4. Public Sector Plan
5. Public Sector with RRSP
6. Maximum DB Pension
7. Max DB Pension + RRSP
13 6 45 27 13 6 45 27 1 3 6 45 27
Source for Figures 4 and 5: Authors’ calculations; see the Appendix.































1. RRSP: 9% Contribution
2. RRSP: Maximum
3. DC Plan: Maximum
4. Public Sector Plan
5. Public Sector with RRSP
6. Maximum DB Pension
7. Max DB Pension + RRSP
Figure 5: Career Accumulations – $75,000 Salary at Retirement (Theoretical Full Career under “Factor of 9”)Essential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute 










1. RRSP: 9% Contribution
2. RRSP: Maximum
3. DC Plan: Maximum
4. Public Sector Plan
5. Public Sector with RRSP
6. Maximum DB Pension
7. Max DB Pension + RRSP













Source for Figures 6 and 7: Authors’ calculations; see the Appendix.




























1. RRSP: 9% Contribution
2. RRSP: Maximum
3. DC Plan: Maximum
4. Public Sector Plan
5. Public Sector with RRSP
6. Maximum DB Pension
7. Max DB Pension + RRSP
Figure 7: Career Accumulations – $150,000 Salary at Retirement (Theoretical Full Career under “Factor of 9”)nine became effective when pension reform was
implemented in 1990 – at the midpoint of each
worker’s career. This raises the question of what
the accumulations might have been if the pension
reform regime had been in effect during the entire
1974-2011 period. If pension reform really did
make the tax rules fairer, one would expect that
the value of DB and DC/RRSP accumulations
over a full career would have been similar.
Accordingly, the second figure in each set shows
the retirement wealth that each worker would
have accumulated if pension reform had been in
effect during the entire period. 
The following points should be noted regarding
each figure: 
￿ The second and third bars show the accumulations
that would occur if the RRSP annuitant or DC
plan member had made the maximum contribution
permitted in each and every year of his or her
career.
6 This would not have happened in practice,
however, because RRSP room is often reduced by
temporary workforce absences and no worker can
or does maximize RRSP contributions throughout
an entire career. These theoretical maximum
accumulations in DC plans and RRSPs thus
illustrate that, even in the most improbably optimistic
scenario, savers in such plans cannot hope to
match the accumulations of DB plan members. 
￿ Each figure shows accumulation values in DC
plans and RRSPs that would result from annual
contributions of 9 percent of earnings, a rate that
shows more realistic – albeit optimistic –
outcomes for savers in DC plans and RRSPs.
￿ DB pension plan members also have RRSP room,
so each figure shows the aggregate value of pension
and RRSP accumulations for public and private
sector DB plan members who maximize their
RRSP contributions in each year of their career. As
with workers who save in DC plans and RRSPs, it
is unlikely that DB plan members would maximize
their RRSP contributions every year. The bars
showing aggregate DB and RRSP accumulations
are presented to provide an apples-to-apples
comparison with the theoretical maximum
accumulations in DC plans and RRSPs. 
￿ The federal public sector pension values reflect the
actual pension values each worker accumulates.
The 35-year and 37-year amounts are equal
because the plan has a 35-year service limit.
The figures tell a dismal story. Those who save for
retirement in DC pension plans and RRSPs
cannot realistically hope to accumulate even half
the pension income of a career public sector
worker. Moreover, as income rises, the gap
between savers in DC plans and RRSPs and
members of DB pension plans increases. The
career outcomes under the factor of nine are
similar to the outcomes under actual tax rules, so
it is evident that pension reform has not delivered
equity of access. Those saving in DC plans and
RRSPs with earnings of $50,000 or $75,000
actually would have been in a worse position if the
factor-of-nine regime had been in place during
their full careers.
The Solution: A Lifetime
Accumulation Limit 
The central weakness of Canada’s tax rules for
retirement saving is that the opportunity to
accumulate pension income varies as a function of
factors unconnected, or only remotely connected,
to an individual’s need for retirement income,
including duration of labour force participation in
Canada, earnings history, earnings volatility, the
opportunity to participate in a DB pension plan,
the timing of pension or RRSP contributions, and
investment returns or losses. A major reform is
needed to render these factors irrelevant to how
much saving room each worker receives. 
C.D. Howe Institute
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6 The Income Tax Act did not limit DC contributions to a percentage of income until 1990, so it theoretically would have been possible for
employer/employee DC contributions before that year to be more – as much as 40 percent of salary for a worker earning $50,000 at
retirement and 26 percent of salary for a worker earning $75,000 at retirement. However, this would have been very unlikely to happen in
practice, so the calculations apply the same 20 percent cap on pre-1990 DC contributions that applied on pre-1991 RRSP contributions.The simplest and best fix is to replace the factor
of nine with a uniform lifetime retirement-savings
accumulation limit. As are current retirement-
saving limits, a lifetime limit should be indexed to
the average industrial wage. It should be high
enough to ensure that most workers have enough
saving room to provide for adequate income
replacement when they retire, but not so high as
to facilitate excessive tax deferral. 
The (Two) Million Dollar Question 
How much should the lifetime accumulation limit
be? Below, we present six benchmarks, summarized
in Figure 8, that could be used to establish the
limit. Each is determined by reference to current,
historical, or proposed retirement saving limits
under the Income Tax Act, or to benefits now
provided under DB pension plans.
1. RRSP – 9 percent contribution: The maximum
RRSP savings for a 2011 retiree who contributed 
9 percent of earnings to an RRSP in each year of a
35-year career would be $657,757. This is slightly
higher than the typical member contribution rate
for a public sector pension plan. 
7
Benchmark 1: $0.66 million
2. Theoretical RRSP maximum: A high-income
worker retiring in 2011 having made maximum
RRSP contributions for 35 years could have
accumulated $846,636. Though not practically
achievable, this amount could be used as a
benchmark. 
Benchmark 2: $0.85 million
3. Pension reform target: Pension reform originally
was intended to allow a maximum annual pension
of 70 percent of the amount that is 2.5 times the
year’s maximum pensionable earnings (Canada
1995). With the YMPE at $48,300 in 2011, that
would translate to a career-end salary of $120,750
and an annual pension of $84,525. The cost of
this pension at age 60 is $1,945,935.
8
Benchmark 3: $1.95 million
4. Federal public sector pension plan: The federal
public sector pension plan currently pays an
annual lifetime benefit of $87,769 to a worker
earning $150,000 at retirement, plus temporary
bridging benefits of $11,520 after 35 years of
service. The cost of this pension at age 60 is
$2,076,197. 
Benchmark 4: $2.08 million
5. Current DB limit: A DB pension plan can pay a
maximum annual lifetime benefit of $89,328 plus
temporary bridging benefits of $11,817 annually
after 35 years of pension service. The cost of this
pension at age 60 is $2,113,504. 
Benchmark 5: $2.11 million
6. 1976 DB limit (real): In 1976, the Income Tax Act
limited DB pension benefits to $1,715 per year of
service to a maximum of 35 years. With the
exception of an $8 increase in 1990, the 1976
limit remained essentially unchanged until 2004.
In real terms, the 1976 limit would be $4,070 per
year of service in 2011 – 2.4 times more than the
nominal limit in 1976. After 35 years of service,
the annual benefit would be $142,450. The cost of
this pension at age 60 is $3,279,522.
9
Benchmark 6: $3.28 million
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7 By way of example, member contributions to the federal public sector pension plan are currently 5.8 percent of earnings up to the year’s
maximum pensionable earnings (YMPE) and 8.4 percent on earnings above the YMPE. Member contributions to the British Columbia
Public Sector Pension Plan are 7.8 percent up to the YMPE and 9.3 percent above the YMPE. Required member contributions to the
Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System (for members with a normal retirement age of 65) are 7.4 percent of earnings up to the
YMPE and 10.7 percent on earnings above the YMPE.
8 Excluding temporary bridge benefits worth approximately $56,000.
9 Assuming wage inflation of 2.5 percent from 1976 to 2011 and not including bridging benefits worth approximately $56,000.Figure 8 suggests that the starting amount for
an indexed lifetime accumulation limit should be
$2 million. Post-retirement expenses are likely to
be lower than during working life, so most
workers would not need a pension that replaces all
of their pre-retirement income. Many regard a
pension of 60 percent of final earnings as the right
replacement ratio, reducing to 50 percent for
higher-income workers (see Baker and Milligan
2009; Horner 2009; Whitehouse 2009). The
investment management industry tends to suggest
a higher replacement ratio – say, 80 percent
(Fidelity Investments 2007). A 70 percent target
replacement ratio has long been a central feature
of Canada’s tax rules for retirement saving: after a
35-year career, a DB pension plan can pay a
pension that replaces 70 percent of the best three-
year average earnings. 
For each benchmark accumulation, Figures 9
and 10 show pension incomes and pre-retirement
salaries for retirement at ages 60 and 65, based on
a 65 percent replacement ratio. This is the mid-
point between the 60 percent target suggested by
many experts and the 70 percent target under
current tax rules.
The amount at which a lifetime accumulation
limit should be established is ultimately a policy
question: what level of income replacement
should the “tax-assisted” retirement saving system
support? Irrespective of the answer, it seems
obvious that the same level of tax deferral for
retirement saving should be available to everyone.
A quick scan of the pension amounts in Figure 11
– which do not include CPP/OAS benefits –
suggests that $1 million is enough for some
workers, $2 million is enough for most workers,
and almost no one needs $4 million. A lifetime
accumulation limit in the range of $1-2 million
thus seems appropriate since it is enough
accumulation room for most workers to maintain
C.D. Howe Institute
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Recommended Lifetime Limit 
$2 Million
1. RRSP: 9% Contribution
2. RRSP: Maximum
3. Pension Reform Target
4. Federal Public Sector Pension
5. Current  DB Pension Limit
6. 1976  DB Limit (real)
Figure 8: Benchmark Accumulations and Recommended Lifetime LimitEssential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute 
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Figure 10: Pension/RRSP Income for Benchmark Accumulations, Retirement at Age 65
Note: The stylized CPP/OAS pension amounts reflect the conversion of the age-60 actuarial present value of the 2016 estimated average
OAS pension and the average age 65 CPP pension (reduced 6 percent per year for retirement before age 65 and payable immediately) to a
standard form of pension (see Appendix Table A-1, panels A-D). The OAS clawback is applied using nominal average CPP/OAS amounts
payable at age 65, which were determined by applying a 2 percent inflation rate to the 2011 OAS average benefit of $495.68 and to the 2011
clawback threshold of $67,688.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see the Appendix.
Note: The stylized CPP/OAS pension amounts reflect the conversion of the age 65 actuarial present value of the 2011 average CPP/OAS
pensions to a standard form of pension ((see Appendix Table A-1, panels A-D). The OAS clawback is applied using the 2011 threshold of
$67,688 and the 2011 average CPP/OAS monthly benefits of $512.38 and $495.68, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see the Appendix.their living standards in retirement. To narrow it
down further, $2 million seems like a good choice
for the following reasons:
￿ $2 million corresponds approximately to
benchmarks 4 and 5 – the value of pensions
received by high-income career members of
generous DB pension plans. A limit based on the
actual value of pensions currently in pay is
intuitively defensible.
￿ $2 million is enough for all workers up to the
highest income level that could reasonably be
characterized as “middle class” to achieve adequate
income replacement in retirement. This is
consistent with the stated policy objectives of
Canada’s tax-assisted retirement saving system. 
￿ Since a $2 million limit would amount to a
decrease in the current DB pension limit, it would
address federal Finance Department concerns
about excessive tax deferral.
What about Unused RRSP Room? 
Unused RRSP room is often cited as evidence that
Canadians are not saving as much for retirement
as they could, or should (see, for example, Ontario
2010; TD Economics 2010). Since Canadians had
more than $670 billion of unused RRSP room in
2010, why do they need a $2 million accumulation
limit? Appearances, however, can be deceiving.
Though large in total, unused RRSP contribution
room does not amount to much per person.
Canadians with new RRSP room in 2010 were,
on average, 42 years of age and had average carry-
forward and new RRSP room (shown in Table 3)
of $31,200 (Statistics Canada Tables 1 and 2). A
worker of average age who contributed this
amount to an RRSP immediately and earned a net
investment return of 5 percent would accumulate
$75,000 by age 60 – enough for a pension of only
$3,300 annually, or $275 monthly.
A 60 percent Pension: 
The Impossible Dream? 
In 2007, the average family income for a two-
earner couple with children was $99,500
(Statistics Canada Table 12). 
Let us assume that each earner in the couple is
of median workforce age (41 years), has $60,000
in retirement savings and the average carry-forward
RRSP room shown in Table 3, and the couple’s
goal is to retire at age 60 – the mid-point between
median public and private sector retirement ages –
with an indexed annual pension income that
replaces 60 percent of pre-retirement family income.
Further, let us assume that the couple expects
family income and invested RRSP savings to grow
at 3 percent and 5 percent, respectively, from age
41 to age 60. 
To reach its goal, our couple needs to accumulate
retirement benefits worth $2.34 million at age 60.
The couple also expects to receive average
CPP/OAS benefits at age 65, which have an
estimated present value of $635,000 at age 60 
(see Appendix Table A-2). To accumulate the
additional $1.71 million the couple needs for its
target 60 percent pension, the two will need to
top up their RRSPs immediately to the extent of
their unused room and then contribute 31 percent
of their family income to their RRSPs every year
until they retire. But the tax rules limit their
annual RRSP contributions to 18 percent of
earnings, which means they will have only 
58 percent of the RRSP contribution room they
need to achieve their target pension. They must
accept a lower standard of living in retirement, 
or save in other ways. 
Of course, the 18 percent RRSP contribution
limit would not prevent our couple from
achieving the target if it had sufficient RRSP
savings at age 41. How much? With RRSP savings
of $387,000, the couple could achieve its target
retirement income with an 18 percent contribution
rate. But our couple would not have $387,000 of
RRSP savings because this amount is 4.8 times
more than the reported average $80,000 of RRSP
savings for families with after-tax incomes of
$85,000 or greater (Statistics Canada 2008b). 
The Uneven Distribution of RRSP Room 
Exactly how many Canadians do not have enough
RRSP room? This question is impossible to
answer with certainty because the required data
C.D. Howe Institute
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1. Retirement at 55
2. Retirement at 60
3. Retirement at 65
Figure 11: Pension Income for Accumulations of $1-4 million
Source: Authors’ calculations; see the Appendix.
Table 3: RRSP Contribution Room in 2010
Source: Statistics Canada 2010b, tables RR-01, RR-02.
Carry-Forward Room from 2009 New Room for 2010
$589 billion $82 billion
Persons with carry-forward 
or new room
22.1 million 17 .6 million
Average per person  $26,600 $4,600
are difficult or impossible to obtain.
10 Available
information suggests fairly clearly, however, that
Canadians’ average holdings of retirement savings
and unused RRSP contribution room are modest
– particularly for those in the private sector. As
income rises, Canadians contribute to RRSPs at
greater rates and have less accumulated RRSP
room (Canada 2010b; TD Economics 2010). This
makes sense, given that low-income workers
should not be contributing to RRSPs and would
10 There are no reliable data for accumulated retirement savings and RRSP room correlated with age and income. Statistics Canada’s
Longitudinal Administrative Databank, however, tracks RRSP room and contributions correlated with income and age, and would be
expected to show that older, higher-income Canadians without pension coverage use all their RRSP room.be better off saving for retirement in Tax Free
Savings Accounts (Shillington 2003; Laurin and
Poschmann 2010). In 2000, Canadians earning
more than $60,000 held less than 12 percent of all
unused RRSP room (Holt 2000). Older studies
have arrived at similar conclusions: most unused
RRSP room is held by lower-income workers,
while higher-income workers contribute to RRSPs
at significantly greater rates: 
“A large proportion of unused RRSP room is held
by workers with low incomes, many of whom may
never be in a financial position to contribute to
RRSPs.” (Frenken 1998.)
“Not unexpectedly, filers with personal incomes of
$30,000 or over (1990 dollars) were responsible
for the bulk of…growth [in RRSP
contributions].” (Frenken 1997.)
Indeed, no insights can be gained by looking 
at Canadians’ RRSP room as an aggregate
phenomenon because retirement savings and
unused RRSP room vary substantially depending
on personal factors, including include years of
residency in Canada, earnings, annual fluctuations
in earnings, absences from the workforce, pension
plan membership, RRSP contribution history,
investment returns or losses, and in-career RRSP
withdrawals. 
Withdrawals and Investment Losses 
Between June 2008 and May 2009, the S&P/TSX
Composite Index lost half its value. Such capital
market losses affect DB pension funds and RRSP
investors alike, with one important difference:
sponsors of DB pension plans can and do increase
contributions to compensate for investment losses,
whereas the tax rules prohibit RRSP investors
from doing so. The inability to increase RRSP
contributions to make up for investment losses
increases the likelihood that RRSP room will not
be sufficient. 
Many Canadians ages 35 to 54 make withdrawals
from their RRSPs, mostly for reasons of financial
hardship. A February 2011 survey of more 
than 1,500 Canadians revealed that four out of
ten individuals have withdrawn funds from 
their RRSPs for emergencies such as job loss 
(36 percent), debt repayment (26 percent), home
purchases/renovations (25 percent), and personal
or children’s education (10 percent); only 6 percent
of withdrawals were for discretionary vacation 
and leisure expenses.
11 Contribution room is not
restored when withdrawals are made, except to a
limited extent for principal-residence and education
costs. This suggests that many Canadians who
have withdrawn funds from their RRSPs 
before retirement will not have enough RRSP
contribution room. 
Delayed RRSP Saving Means Less 
RRSP Room 
Many Canadians who have not used their RRSP
contribution room will not have enough. This
seems counterintuitive, but it makes sense if one
considers typical lifetime earning and consumption
patterns. Individuals typically defer retirement
saving to later in their careers, when their earnings
are likely to be highest and their non-discretionary
expenses lowest. When they do start to save, the
value of unused RRSP room carried forward from
past years will have been eroded by inflation. As
the example of the average couple above
demonstrates, they will not be able to catch up.
The Verdict on RRSP Room
The only conclusions that can be drawn from
available data are that some Canadians have more
RRSP room than they need and some do not have
enough – even though they may not yet have used
all the RRSP room they have. 
With a lifetime accumulation limit, all Canadians
will have enough RRSP contribution room. And,
C.D. Howe Institute
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11 “BMO Study: Troubling Trend Sees Canadians Dipping into Their RRSPs Prior to Retirement,” Marketwire, February 26, 2011.as is now the case, some will have more than they
need or can use.
Retirement Benefits: A Lifetime
Accumulation Limit Would Deliver 
A retirement income system that serves all
Canadian workers would be expected to have
certain features and benefits, which we summarize
in Table 4. In terms of delivering on these
expectations, how would a lifetime accumulation
limit compare to the factor of nine? Again, we
provide the answers in Table 4. Some features,
however, deserve particular mention, especially
those that would promote better pension coverage
and address the challenges of an aging population.
Allow New Retirement Plan Designs 
Canada’s tax rules stifle innovation in pension
plan design because pension plans must be either
DB or DC and be sponsored by an employer. DB
pension coverage has declined dramatically as
employers have sought to shift pension risks to
employees by establishing DC pension plans and
group RRSPs in which the employer’s only
obligation is to contribute a percentage of salary.
This shifting of risk comes at a price: those who
save in CAPs must select their own investments
and often realize lower net investment returns
than large DB plans typically deliver (Bauer and
Frehen 2008; Jog 2009). Canada’s tax rules create
a dilemma: DB pension plans offer economy of
scale but force employers to shoulder funding risk.
Employers do not want the risk, so they offer DC
pension plans and group RRSPs, which have
higher costs. 
A lifetime accumulation limit would cut the
Gordian knot that ties pension plan design to the
DB/DC paradigm and to employer sponsorship.
With only one design restriction – that benefits
should not exceed the accumulation limit – a
practically infinite range of pension designs would
become available, limited only by the creativity of
retirement plan consultants. Here are some
examples of new pension designs that a lifetime
accumulation limit would facilitate. 
￿ Target-benefit plans: Such plans would pay DB-like
benefits and be funded entirely by workers, by a
fixed employer contribution, or both, leveraging
economies of scale of large DB pension plans with
more sustainable allocations of risk.
￿ Profit-based plans: Contributions to a profit-based
plan could be linked to salary or to a target
benefit, subject to employer profits. Unlike DB
pension plans, which typically require increased
contributions during economic downturns, the
employer’s contribution obligations would be anti-
cyclical, making the plan more sustainable over the
long term.
￿ Third-party administration plans: As proposed in a
previous paper in this series (Pierlot 2008),
pension plans could be established on a
subscription basis by employer or industry
associations, consultancies, financial institutions,
and even public sector pension plans. Third-party
administration would improve access to high-
quality, cost-effective pension administration
services.
12 Ideally, pension plans administered by
third parties should be permitted to operate on a
target-benefit and/or DC basis, funded by
contributions from members and/or employers.
With appropriate rules for governance and
conflicts of interest, any entity capable of
providing competent service should be eligible to
be a third-party administrator.
13
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12 In December 2010, the federal government made a timid first step in this direction by proposing pooled registered pension plans (PRPPs)
that could offer individual pension accounts analogous to RRSPs. PRPPs have received an enthusiastic endorsement from financial
institutions in the retail and group asset management businesses (Scott-Clarke and Lamb 2010), but labour-side pension reform advocates
have concluded that “PRPPs reproduce most of the problems individual investors characteristically face with individual and group RRSPs”
(Canadian Labour Congress 2011).
13 At least one major public sector pension plan – the Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System – has indicated a strong interest in
managing private sector pension assets (see Perkins 2011), and there is no apparent reason why this should not be an option given that
public sector pension plans have a demonstrated capacity for effective pension fund management.C.D. Howe Institute
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Table 4: Lifetime Accumulation Limit versus the Factor of Nine
a Subject to prescribed limits, pension plans may allow accrual during periods of absence.
b As recommended in previous papers of this series (see esp. Pierlot 2008) and in reports of the Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions,
the Alberta/B.C. Joint Expert Panel on Pension Standards and the Nova Scotia Pension Review Panel.
c DC Plans and RRSPs do not limit accumulations, so skilled investors who start saving early and maximize their contributions have – in
theory – an opportunity to accumulate large amounts of tax-deferred retirement wealth. But this opportunity is unavailable to the vast












1. Compensates for investment losses with
increased contribution room
yes yes no no
2. Provides contribution/accumulation room for
temporary workforce absences 
yes sometimes
a sometimes no
3. Workers with fluctuating income can have the
same pension as workers with steady income
yes no no no
4. Allows maximum accrual irrespective of plan
type or design 
yes no no no
5. Promotes new, innovative retirement plan
designs, especially risk-shared, target benefit,
and pooled pension plans
b
yes no no no
6. Provides enough pension saving room for
most workers 
yes sometimes rarely rarely
7 . Complete flexibility in terms of timing and
amount of contributions
yes no no no
8. Accommodates typical “back-loaded” 
retirement saving behaviour; provides 
equal saving room to late-career savers
yes no no no
9. Provides same saving room to public sector,
private sector, employed and self-employed workers
yes no no no
10. Equal access for Canadian-born and 
immigrant workers
yes no no no
11. Prevents “excessive” tax deferral yes yes no no
c
12. Provides equal saving room independently
of employer sponsorship
yes no no no
13. Simple, comprehensible regulatory structure yes no no no
14. Low regulatory/compliance costs/risks yes no no no
15. Facilitates use of severance payments for
retirement saving
yes no no no
16. Restores contribution room for in-service
withdrawals; promotes greater horizontal equity
through tax-rate averaging; facilitates temporary
income replacement during periods of absence
from workforce due to employment, disability,
retraining or childcare
yes no no no
17 . Promotes extended labour force participation
by allowing value of early retirement incentives
to be preserved and paid as larger pension
when retirement is delayed 
yes no not applicable not applicable
18. Provides reliable, up-to-date statistical 
information about how much Canadians have
saved for retirement
yes no no noMake Catch-up Retirement Saving Possible 
Canadians are having children later, spending
more, and saving less (TD Economics 2010). As a
result of these decisions, however, their failure to
contribute to retirement saving or to accumulate
savings beginning early in their careers results in a
permanent loss of RRSP accumulation room. For
those who have the ability to save later in their
careers, a lifetime accumulation limit would allow
them to accumulate the same pension amounts as
those who began earlier, and would ensure that
contribution room was restored if investment
losses depleted the value of their retirement savings. 
Promote Longer Workforce Participation 
Figure 11 offers an obvious but important insight:
pensions cost more when one retires early and less
when one retires later. Private sector DB pension
plans often have early retirement penalties, but
public sector plans typically waive these penalties
when an age-plus-service milestone of 85 is
attained. Delaying retirement means losing the
value of early retirement benefits. For example, a
55-year-old federal public sector worker earning
$75,000 with 30 years of pension service is
entitled to an immediate life pension of $32,777
per year, plus “bridging” benefits of $9,874 per
year, payable to age 65. If the worker chooses not
to retire immediately, the value of his or her
annual compensation reduces from $75,000 per
year to $32,349 per year – the difference between
salary and forgone pension payments. Not
surprisingly, workers in this situation decide to
retire, even though they might prefer to continue
working. As the population ages and the
workforce shrinks, this will have significant and
undesirable implications for the labour supply
(Schirle 2008). 
Under current tax rules, the value of forgone
early retirement benefits cannot be preserved. A
lifetime accumulation limit, however, would allow
the value of early retirement benefits to be
“repackaged” on a value-equivalent basis as a
larger pension payable later. This would encourage
higher rates of labour force participation among
older workers and facilitate phased retirement.
One study suggested that 25 percent of retirees
would not have retired if they could have
continued working part-time without their
pensions being affected (Morissette et al. 2004). 
A lifetime accumulation limit would offer an
opportunity to slow the erosion of the labour
income tax base as the population ages. For
workers in “phased retirement” arrangements who
are receiving a blend of employment and pension
income, it would increase retirement saving
flexibility by restoring contribution room as
pension income is paid.
Increase Future Tax Revenue 
As the population ages, governments will face an
increasing burden to support retired workers who
have not saved enough. Since pension and RRSP
saving only defers tax, the government is a “saving
partner” because increased contributions today
mean more tax tomorrow. As entitlement
spending increases for an aging population, the
increased contributions that a lifetime
accumulation limit would make possible might
well smooth governments’ cash flows over the long
term and partially replace an eroding labour
income tax base with tax revenue from pension
plans and RRSPs (Brown 2002).
Manage What You Measure 
Pension adjustments now reported to the Canada
Revenue Agency (CRA) provide little information
about how much Canadians have saved for
retirement, so it is little wonder that governments
have difficulty in deciding what policies might be
necessary or effective in promoting adequate
retirement saving. The annual reporting that a
lifetime accumulation limit would require would
provide granular, accurate, and timely information
about how much wealth Canadians have
accumulated in their pension plans and RRSPs,
giving federal and provincial governments a powerful
new tool with which to develop targeted policy
measures to promote adequate retirement saving. 
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As noted, a lifetime accumulation limit would
require the annual reporting of pension and RRSP
values to the CRA. The required data could be
generated using information now available to plan
administrators and custodians. Analogously to
current rules for excess contributions, excess
accumulations would be subject to a penalty tax
until withdrawn, with benefit payments to
commence no later than the end of the year an
individual attains age 71 – or perhaps later, given
that life expectancy is increasing (Robson 2008).
Using the CRA’s RRSP Deduction Limit
Statement as a model, Table 5 shows the kind of
annual pension accumulation statement the CRA
might issue each year. An optional feature, the
pension income estimates, would contribute to
financial literacy by helping workers to answer for
themselves the most important questions in
retirement saving: how much do I need to retire,
and how close am I to my goal?
Transitioning to a Lifetime Limit 
In implementing a lifetime accumulation limit, a
number of transitional and administrative issues
would arise. 
￿ Reporting pension values: Similar to the annual
reporting of RRSP contributions and pension
adjustments that current rules require, a lifetime
limit would require annual reporting of each
individual’s pension and RRSP values to the CRA.
For members of DC pension plans and RRSP
annuitants, the reported amount would be the
year-end market value of their assets. For those in
DB pension plans, the standard for determining
lump-sum pension values in section 3500 of the
Canadian Institute of Actuaries Standards of
Practice (Canadian Institute of Actuaries 2010a)
could be used because it is broadly accepted by
pension regulators as an appropriate methodology
for determining the present (lump-sum) value of
DB pension benefits for individual members.
While plan administrators would incur expenses to
establish automated reporting systems, they would
also realize some savings by no longer having to
report pension adjustments. 
￿ Pre-existing accumulations: Since pension and
RRSP accumulations of some individuals would
exceed the lifetime accumulation limit, existing
accumulations should be grandfathered, as would
be consistent with Canada’s established practice of
avoiding retroactive tax increases.
￿ Withdrawal grace period: Since individuals might
not always know if the year-end value of their
pension and RRSP wealth exceeded the
accumulation limit, there should be a one-year
grace period in which to withdraw excess
accumulations. 
￿ Locking-in: Since pension standards legislation
generally prohibits cash withdrawals of pension
benefits, the legislation would have to be amended
to accommodate the withdrawal of pension values
that exceed the lifetime accumulation limit. 
￿ Reporting and compliance: Since the administration
of a lifetime accumulation limit would require the
annual reporting of pension, RRSP, and RRIF
values to the CRA, pension plan administrators,
RRSP/RRIF issuers, and the CRA would need a
reasonable time in which to develop reporting and
compliance systems. 
￿ De-accumulation: Current tax rules require RRIF
payments, pension payments, and benefits from an
annuity purchased with pension or RRSP funds to
commence by the end of the year in which a
pension plan member or RRSP annuitant attains
age 71. These rules could continue to apply under
a lifetime accumulation limit regime. However, the
current minimum-payment RRIF withdrawal rules
erode the purchasing power of retirees over time,
force premature liquidation of investments that
have lost value in a market downturn, and prevent
low-income RRIF annuitants from receiving
income-tested benefits such as the GIS (Robson
2008). These problems could be addressed by
replacing the current minimum-withdrawal rules
with a declining-limit RRIF withdrawal schedule
that would require all RRIF assets to be exhausted
by a particular age – say, 95. For many RRIF
holders, a declining-limit withdrawal schedule
would not force withdrawals and would help them
manage their retirement savings more effectively.
C.D. Howe Institute
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2012 Pension Accumulation Statement
Amounts marked with an asterisk (*) cannot be less than zero.
Pension Accumulation Account Summary
Your Pension Accumulation Account value at the end of 2010 $150,000 *
Net increase (decrease) in 2011 $50,000
Your Pension Accumulation Account value at the end of 2011 $200,000 *
2012 Pension Accumulation Room
Pension Accumulation Limit for 2011 $2,000,000 *
Minus:Your Pension Accumulation Account value at the end of 2011 $200,000 *
Excess Pension Accumulation $0 *
Your Pension Accumulation Room for 2012 $1,800,000 *
Pension Income Estimates
Your age at the end of 2011 50 Years
Your Pension Accumulation Account value at the end of 2011 $200,000
Divided by:Your Pension Annuity Factor for retirement at Age 55 24.22
Equals:Your estimated annual pension income if you retire at age 55 $8,257 .64
Divided by:Your Pension Annuity Factor for retirement at Age 60 19.92
Equals:Your estimated annual pension income if you retire at age 60 $10,040.16
Divided by:Your Pension Annuity Factor for retirement at Age 65 16.07
Equals:Your estimated annual pension income if you retire at age 65 $12,445.55
Important Information
￿ Your Pension Accumulation Account includes the total value of all retirement benefits held on your behalf in your Registered
Retirement Plans (RRPs) as reported to the Canada Revenue Agency. 
￿ An Excess Pension Accumulation is the amount (if any) that exceeds the current-year Pension Accumulation Limit. A penalty
tax of 1% per month is applied to an Excess Pension Accumulation that you do not withdraw within the one-year period
following the date of this Pension Accumulation Statement. Withdrawals are included in your taxable income. 
￿ The net increase or decrease in your Pension Accumulation Account reflects all changes in the value of benefits in your RRPs
since the end of the previous year. New pension service credits, contributions and investment earnings increase the value of
your Pension Accumulation Account. Withdrawals, investment losses and reductions in pension service credits decrease the
value of your Pension Accumulation Account. 
￿ The Pension Accumulation Limit increases annually by the percentage increase in the Year’s Maximum Pensionable Earnings
under the Canada Pension Plan and the Quebec Pension Plan. After the end of the year you attain age 71, the Pension
Accumulation Limit decreases by a prescribed amount, unless you have applied the full balance of your Pension Accumulation
Account to purchase a lifetime pension annuity that meets prescribed requirements. 
￿ You cannot accumulate new benefits in an RRP in which you participate after the end of the year in which you attain age 71.
You cannot contribute to your spouse’s RRP after the end of the year in which he or she attains age 71.
￿ The Pension Income Estimates are provided to help you decide whether you are meeting your retirement-saving goals. For each
retirement age, the estimates show the annual retirement income that could be purchased from an annuities provider with the
current-year value of your Pension Accumulation Account for a life pension guaranteed for 5 years with a spousal survivor
benefit of 66 2/3% and indexed at 3% per annum. Each Pension Annuity Factor is determined for your age on a unisex basis
using generally-accepted actuarial principles. The actual amount of pension income you receive when you retire could be more
or less depending on a number of factors, including your age at retirement, whether you have a spouse when you retire, the
form in which you choose to receive your retirement income, and prevailing interest rates. The Canada Revenue Agency does
not provide financial advice. Should you have any questions regarding your Pension Income Estimates, consult with your
financial advisor. Conclusion 
A consensus is developing that Canada’s rules for
retirement saving are unfair and ought not to
continue in their present form. In 2010, legislation
was introduced in Parliament that would have
guaranteed all Canadians “the same opportunity
to accumulate pension income as any other
individual” without regard to age, occupation or
country of origin.
14 It seems obvious that all
workers should have the same opportunity to
prepare for a comfortable retirement, but there is
no doubt that this is not the case right now.
The best way to reform Canada’s tax rules for
retirement saving would be to implement a
lifetime accumulation limit. Such a limit would be
the simplest way to ensure equitable and equal
access to pension and RRSP accumulation room,
while preventing excessive deferral of tax. A
lifetime accumulation limit would help middle-
and upper-middle-income workers, for whom the
tax-assisted retirement saving system has always
been intended, but it would not ensure that every
Canadian worker will be a happy retiree. Lower-
income workers who cannot save would continue
to rely on programs such as the CPP, the OAS,
and the Guaranteed Income Supplement. For
those who are able to save but do not, “push”
approaches might well prove necessary, including
auto-enrollment in new kinds of sustainable plan
designs administered by employers or third parties,
or perhaps through the voluntary or compulsory
expansion of the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans.
In any event, a lifetime accumulation limit would
make these solutions easier to implement and
provide good information about who needs them. 
Because of the federal government’s broad
constitutional authority over “The Raising of
Money by any Mode or System of Taxation,”
15 the
rules for retirement saving under the Income Tax
Act have always been the “dog that wags the tail”
of provincial and federal pension standards rules,
which were designed to comply with federal tax
law. The federal government takes the largest share
of the income tax pie and administers income tax
for all provinces except Quebec. This means that,
to ensure equity of access to “tax-assisted”
accumulation room, only the federal government
can take the lead on the pension reform file. The
time for action is now; the action needed is the
immediate implementation of an indexed lifetime
retirement benefit accumulation limit that applies
equally to all Canadian workers. 
Developed in a previous century for a very
different workforce, Canada’s tax rules for
retirement saving presume that most workers
spend their careers with employers willing and
able to shoulder the task of providing for their
employees’ retirement. Except in the public sector,
this presumption is demonstrably wrong. Today,
Canada’s tax rules deprive most workers of the
opportunity to have the adequate and secure
pensions they will need. 
We can do better. A lifetime accumulation limit
is a simple, elegant, and workable fix for Canadians
who do not have career membership in generous
pension plans, and its guarantee of equal and
sufficient access would benefit all Canadian workers.
C.D. Howe Institute
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14 Bill C-574, the Retirement Income Bill of Rights, passed Second Reading but died on the Order Paper when the May 2, 2011, federal election
was called.
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Table A-1: Summary of Actuarial Assumptions
a Benefits in respect of employees in public safety occupations are not included in these assumptions; generally, such benefits have a 
higher value.
Sources: Canada 2010a; Canadian Institute of Actuaries 2010; and OSFI 2009.
Panel A: Economic Assumptions
Annual average industrial wage increases 2.5%
Annual salary increases 3.0%
Annuity purchase discount rate (base case) 4.5%
Post-Retirement Indexing (base case) 3.0% fixed
Net Return on DC/RRSP and Public-Sector Employee Contributions 5.0%
Panel B: Demographic Assumptions
Mortality table UP 1994 projected to 2020, scale AA , unisex, 50% male
Member’s marital status 100% married
Spouse’s age same age as member
Termination assumption nil
Retirement age 55, 60, or 65
Disability rates none
Panel C: Federal Public Sector Pension Assumptions
a
Base formula [(1.3% < YMPE5 + 2% FAE5 > YMPE5) < $2,552] x Service < 35
Earliest unreduced pension age 60
Normal form 66 2/3% survivor benefit, guaranteed 5 years
Post-retirement indexing 3% fixed
Bridge benefit 25% YMPE5 x service/35
Employee contributions 5% of salary < YMPE + 8% of salary > YMPE
AppendixC.D. Howe Institute
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Table A-1: Summary of Actuarial Assumptions
b There is no determinable “maximum” DB pension because the value of such a pension varies as a function of a number of variables,
including the benefit formula of the plan, the rate of post-retirement indexing (if any), age at retirement, salary and years of service, 
discount rates, life expectancy, and marital status. The assumptions shown for a maximum DB pension are selected to show reasonable
values for career membership in a generous DB pension plan. Earlier retirement dates, longer service, and a spouse significantly younger
than the member would increase the value of DB pensions significantly compared with the values shown throughout this Commentary.
Sources: Canada 2010a; Canadian Institute of Actuaries 2010; and OSFI 2009.
Panel E: Canada Pension Plan and Old Age Security Pension Assumptions
Average CPP in 2011 $512.38 per month
Average OAS in 2011 $495.68 per month
CPP/OAS pre-retirement indexing 3% / 2%
CPP/OAS post-retirement indexing 3% fixed
Annuity purchase discount rate  4.5%
CPP form of pension 60% survivor benefit, no guarantee
OAS form of pension life only, no guarantee
Mortality UP 1994 projected to 2020, Scale AA , unisex, 50% male
Panel D: Maximum Defined-Benefit Pension Assumptions
b
Base formula (2% FAE3 < $2,552) x service
Earliest unreduced pension Age 60
Normal form 66 2/3% survivor benefit, guaranteed 5 years
Post-retirement indexing 3% fixed
Bridge benefit CPP/OAS to age 65, up to tax limits
Employee contributions noneEssential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute 
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Table A-2: YMPE & OAS Amounts; Money Purchase, RRSP, and Defined Benefit Limits, 1974-2011 
a The money purchase limit for a full career under the current pension reform system is the 2011 limit discounted at wage inflation of 
2.5 percent. The DB and RRSP limits (not shown) used for full-career calculations are derived from these values. DB accumulations under
the full-career scenarios are the same as under actual tax rules because current DB limits apply to all years of service.
b A cap of 20 percent of salary was applied to pre–1990 DC contributions.
Sources: Canada 2010a; CCH Canadian Limited 1970–90; and Canadian Institute of Actuaries 2010b.
YMPE OAS Pension and RRSP Limits












1974 6,600 5,680 5,900
1975 7 ,400 6,100 6,533
1976 8,300 6,680 7 ,433
1977 9,300 7 ,440 8,333
1978 10,400 8,400 9,333
1979 11,700 9,420 10,467
1980 13,100 10,560 11,733
1981 14,700 11,840 13,167
1982 16,500 13,280 14,767
1983 18,500 14,900 16,567
1984 20,800 16,720 18,600
1985 23,400 18,780 20,900
1986 25,800 21,000 23,333
1987 25,900 22,880 25,033
1988 26,500 24,480 26,067
1989 27 ,700 25,860 26,700
1990 28,900 26,960 27 ,700
1991 30,500 27 ,900 29,033
1992 32,200 29,160 30,533
1993 33,400 30,540 32,033
1994 34,400 31,880 33,333
1995 34,900 33,080 34,233
1996 35,400 34,060 34,900
1997 35,800 34,780 35,367
1998 36,900 35,480 36,033
1999 37 ,400 36,080 36,700
2000 37 ,600 36,620 37 ,300
2001 38,300 37 ,200 37 ,767
2002 39,100 37 ,860 38,333
2003 39,900 38,460 39,100
2004 40,500 39,080 39,833
2005 41,100 39,780 40,500
2006 42,100 40,540 41,233
2007 43,700 41,460 42,300
2008 44,900 42,460 43,567
2009 46,300 43,620 44,967
2010 47 ,200 44,840 46,133
2011 48,300 46,080 47 ,267
108.14 110.09 112.95 117 .02
120.06 123.42 125.76 129.28
132.90 135.43 137 .06 139.39
141.34 143.46 147 .05 150.43
153.44 156.66 159.79 164.74
167 .27 170.39 174.82 179.02
182.42 186.80 191.78 196.33
202.14 208.20 214.86 221.74
227 .73 232.97 239.73 246.92
250.62 254.13 256.67 260.52
263.78 266.28 269.74 272.17
273.80 276.54 280.14 282.94
285.20 288.34 291.51 294.43
297 .37 300.34 303.64 308.19
310.66 313.15 315.97 320.08
323.28 325.87 330.43 337 .04
340.07 343.13 347 .93 351.41
354.92 362.37 369.62 373.32
374.07 374.44 376.31 378.19
378.95 381.60 383.51 384.66
385.81 387 .74 387 .74 387 .74
387 .74 388.52 392.41 394.76
394.76 395.55 397 .92 399.91
400.71 403.51 405.12 406.34
407 .15 407 .15 408.78 410.82
410.82 411.23 413.70 417 .42
419.92 420.34 424.12 428.79
431.36 433.52 436.55 442.66
442.66 442.66 443.99 449.32
453.36 456.08 461.55 461.55
462.47 463.39 466.63 471.76
471.76 473.65 476.97 479.83
484.63 484.63 487 .54 491.93
491.93 491.93 497 .83 502.31
502.31 502.31 505.83 516.96
516.96 516.96 516.96 516.96
516.96 516.96 518.51 521.62
521.62 521.62 521.62 521.62
9,213 5,000 4,000 1,143
9,443 5,000 4,000 1,143
9,679 7 ,000 5,500 1,715
9,921 7 ,000 5,500 1,715
10,169 7 ,000 5,500 1,715
10,423 7 ,000 5,500 1,715
10,684 7 ,000 5,500 1,715
10,951 7 ,000 5,500 1,715
11,225 7 ,000 5,500 1,715
11,505 7 ,000 5,500 1,715
11,793 7 ,000 5,500 1,715
12,088 7 ,000 5,500 1,715
12,390 7 ,000 7 ,500 1,715
12,700 7 ,000 7 ,500 1,715
13,017 7 ,000 7 ,500 1,715
13,342 7 ,000 7 ,500 1,715
13,676 11,500 7 ,500 1,722
14,018 12,500 11,500 1,722
14,368 12,500 12,500 1,722
14,728 13,500 12,500 1,722
15,096 14,500 13,500 1,722
15,473 15,500 14,500 1,722
15,860 13,500 13,500 1,722
16,256 13,500 13,500 1,722
16,663 13,500 13,500 1,722
17 ,079 13,500 13,500 1,722
17 ,506 13,500 13,500 1,722
17 ,944 13,500 13,500 1,722
18,393 13,500 13,500 1,722
18,853 15,500 14,500 1,722
19,324 16,500 15,500 1,833
19,807 18,000 16,500 2,000
20,302 19,000 18,000 2,111
20,810 20,000 19,000 2,222
21,330 21,000 20,000 2,333
21,863 22,000 21,000 2,444
22,410 22,450 22,000 2,494
22,970 22,970 22,450 2,552Sensitivity Analysis: The Value of a Pension 
Determining the value of lifetime pension benefits
is a science, but not an exact one. This is because
the cost of providing a promised pension depends
upon future events that are unknowable. Valuing a
pension therefore requires making educated
guesses about a pensioner’s longevity and the rate
of return on invested pension assets, among other
things. For a pension indexed to inflation, an
assumption must be made about future inflation
rates. We use annuity purchase rates that reflect
the value of pensions with full inflation indexing
because current tax rules permit DB pension plans
to provide fully indexed pensions and because the
federal public sector plan actually does pay fully
indexed pensions, as do many other public sector
pension plans and some private sector plans. 
Our “base case” for determining DB pension
values uses a 4.5 percent discount rate and fixed-
rate post-retirement indexing of 3 percent. These
rates are considered to the most reasonable
estimate of the value of a fully indexed pension
because they reflect experience with actual quotes
for group purchases of pension annuities with full
inflation indexing; in other words, the “base case”
reflects the real-world market value of pensions. It
should be noted that these group rates would not
be available to individuals, who must pay retail
annuity purchase rates. Retail annuity purchase
rates would be expected to be higher due to sales
commissions and adverse-selection risk.
16
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16 Annuity providers establish annuity prices based on average life expectancy. In the context of pensions, adverse selection refers to an annuity
provider’s risk that an individual is more likely to purchase a lifetime pension annuity if he or she has reason to believe that his or her life




























Figure A-1: Alternative Pension Valuation Bases
Source: Authors’ calculations; see the Appendix.Essential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute 
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The pension values we present in this Commentary
would be different if we used different assumptions
to determine those values. Figure A-1 shows the
sensitivities of our 35-year DB pension values to
four alternative valuation bases: 
￿ the 1993 Canadian Institute of Actuaries basis;
￿ a 4.5 percent discount rate with 2 percent fixed-
rate indexing;
￿ a 5.5 percent discount rate with 3 percent fixed-
rate indexing; and
￿ a 3.5 percent discount rate with 3 percent fixed-
rate indexing.
We do not show a retail annuity purchase basis
because it would overstate the value of pensions
paid from large DB pension plans. In these plans,
there are no commission expenses and little
adverse selection risk because all retirees normally
must receive their benefits in the form of a
lifetime pension annuity.C.D. Howe Institute
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